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Abstract – Résumé
As a classic example of 
musica poetica, Christoph 
Bernhard’s Tractatus compo-
sitionis augmentatus exhibits 
a rhetorical mode of thought. 
But while rhetoric informs an 
aesthetic in which music is 
bound to specific purposes, it 
also gives the foundation for 
theoretical, aesthetic, and 
social principles of musical 
autonomy. Autonomy and 
functionality are not mutually 
exclusive. This article tracks 
the emergence of concepts 
and practices of autonomy in 
the late seventeenth century, 
and, secondly, redefines 
aesthetic autonomy as linked 
to a particular type of func-
tion—the use of music to 
strive toward »the good life,« 
as Aristotle termed the goal of 
human existence.
Keywords: Christoph 
Bernhard • autonomy • 
musica poetica • work 
concept • Johann 
Mattheson • Querelle 
des anciens et des 
modernes
Sometime between his return to the Dresden 
court chapel after his second trip to Italy (1657) and 
his departure for Hamburg (1663), the singer and 
composer Christoph Bernhard (1628-1692) penned a 
treatise in the august tradition of musica poetica.1 The 
Tractatus compositionis augmentatus has become a 
classic example of the rhetorical outlook on compo-
sition in 16th and 17th-century Northern Germany. 
Drawing on their extensive educations in classical 
Latin rhetoric, musicians conceived their art as one 
of effective communication (rather than of organic 
works), which could be learned through codifiable 
rules and techniques. The rhetorical slant of the 
Tracta tus is best known in its classifications of  figures 
1 The exact date of the work is not known. Known today 
only through 18th-century copies, the treatise circulated widely 
in manuscript in the last decades of the 17th century. For a 
 summary on current knowledge of its provenance, see Paul 
 WALKER, Theories of Fugue from the Age of Josquin to the Age of 
Bach, Eastman Studies in Music, no. 13 (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 2000), 152-53.
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(e.g. ellipsis and heterolepsis),2 in its stylistic categories (grave and luxuriant),3 and 
in its catalogue of models for imitation (including Palestrina, Monteverdi, 
 Carissimi, and Schütz among many others), all typical elements in the rhetorical 
 treatises of the time. But even aside from compositional prescriptions, it exhibits 
a rhetorical mode of thought about the basic concept of composition. As was 
 typical of verbal and musical treatises of the time, Bernhard began the treatise 
with a portrayal of his subject matter, defining both counterpoint and musical 
composition by reference to classical rhetoric. As a discipline grounded in persua-
sion and the communicative interaction between orator and audience, rhetoric 
would seem to mark music as functional, as involved in a practice in which music 
serves clear purposes. Music would serve its religious or political uses by moving 
the listener, and it would oppose the principle of aesthetic autonomy—the idea 
that music can be experienced as an end rather than simply a means. This basic 
opposition, while not wholly incorrect, is too simple to do justice to 17th-century 
practice. Because of the very centrality of rhetoric to the treatise, the first chapter 
of Bernhard’s Tractatus offers an excellent starting point to refine the relationship 
between functionality and aesthetic autonomy within the rhetorical tradition.
The task of this paper is to illuminate the complex of artistic practices that 
underpins Christoph Bernhard’s music theory and late 17th-century German 
 musical culture in general. The thesis: The fragmentary practices of autonomy in 
the Tractatus were proper to the world of professional North-German composer-
musicians in the late 17th century. It was a relatively closed world whose profes-
sional structures hovered between those of secretive, localized guilds and the 
communicative, cosmopolitan, but still specialized Republic of Letters. In this 
world, to use a distinction made by Stephen Hinton, musicians undoubtedly 
could think about the theoretical autonomy of their music, the features that gave it 
excellence beyond its function and durability after the event. Without an explicit 
theory of aesthetic autonomy—the principle that music can be considered as an 
end, rather than as a means to some further end—musicians and connoisseurs 
developed its principles in their practices and modes of thought. Finally they 
 developed their practices within set traditions and institutions so as to maximize 
2 Rolf DAMMANN, Der Musikbegriff im deutschen Barock (Cologne: Volk, 1967), 113 and 36; 
 Dietrich BARTEL, Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music (Lincoln: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, 1997); Werner BRAUN, Deutsche Musiktheorie des 15. bis 17. Jahrhunderts: Zweiter 
Teil. Von Calvisius bis Mattheson, ed. Thomas Ertelt and Frieder Zaminer, vol. 8/2, Geschichte der Musik-
theorie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), 332-37; Patrick McCRELESS, Music 
and Rhetoric, in The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory, ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 862-67.
3 Erich KATZ, Die musikalischen Stilbegriffe des 17. Jahrhunderts (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 1926); 
Claude PALISCA, The Genesis of Mattheson’s Style Classification, in New Mattheson Studies, ed. George 
J. Buelow and Hans Joachim Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); W. BRAUN, Deutsche 
Musiktheorie: Von Calvisius bis Mattheson, 376-81, R. DAMMANN, Musikbegriff, 112-13.
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their social autonomy, the independence of action that would allow them control 
over their creative conditions.4 While impossible to separate these three types of 
autonomy neatly, this article will examine each in turn. To close, it will examine 
some of the reasons that French and German intellectuals treated art or artworks 
as autonomous in the late 17th century and early 18th century. While only profes-
sional musicians may have treated music as either theoretically or aesthetically 
autonomous, there were other people at the time who thought about the political 
and moral autonomy of individuals (both aspects of social autonomy, but ones 
that went beyond issues of creative freedom). For many intellectuals, the arts were 
a way to resist political and economic forces that seemed to constrain human 
agency. While these different types of autonomy all were put into practice in the 
17th century, they merged together at the beginning of the 19th century.
It is important to revisit and to refine the concepts of functionality and 
 autonomy in 17th-century rhetorical practice for several reasons. Despite much 
scholarship on the issue, the historical origins of the autonomy aesthetics can still 
be clarified. While some scholars insist that aesthetic autonomy and its correlate, 
the musical work, are thoroughly modern, others note that there is a long  tradition 
of treating music as works. To take only some recent examples, Lydia Goehr has 
insisted that the »separability principle« was only truly »regulative« after 1800, 
while Rob Wegman, Leeman Perkins, and Anthony Newcomb have noted that 
Renaissance musicians did treat music as works, fixing them into notated scores 
and taking pride in their internal consistency.5 John Butt has similarly  noted 
 tendencies towards work-practices in the seventeenth century.6 Taking up the 
 approach suggested by Wegman, Newcomb, and Butt, this article studies the 
 regulative practices as they existed within relatively distinct practices and tradi-
tions, namely those of specialized musicians in late 17th-century Northern 
 Germany.
4 Stephen HINTON, Gebrauchsmusik, in The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, ed. 
Stanley Sadie (New York: Grove’s Dictionaries, 2001), 620.
5 Lydia GOEHR, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 118-19; Rob C. WEGMAN, From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and 
Musical Authorship in the Low Countries, 1450-1500, Journal of the American Musicological Society 49, 
no. 3 (1996); Leeman PERKINS, Concerning the Ontological Status of the Notated Musical Work in the 
15th and 16th Centuries, paper delivered at the Conference of the International Musicological  Society, 
Leuven, Belgium, 5 August 2002; Anthony NEWCOMB, Notions of Notation around 1600, paper 
 delivered at the 69th Annual Meeting of the American Musicological Society, Houston, Texas, 13-16 
November 2003. Reinhard Strohm has aptly called the critiques a symptom of anxieties about the 
 collapse of Western values: Reinhard STROHM, Looking Back at Ourselves: The Problem with the 
Musical Work Concept, in The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?, ed. Michael Talbot (Liverpool: Liver-
pool University Press, 2000), 132-34.
6 John BUTT, The Seventeenth-Century Musical ‘Work’, in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-
Century Music, ed. Tim Carter and John Butt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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1. Theoretical Autonomy: Musical Processes and Musical Works
For the rudiments of a notion of theoretical autonomy, it is helpful to turn to 
a single document, and even to a single passage. The first chapter of Bernard’s 
treatise, a definition of music in terms common to many treatises of the time, is as 
follows. (I have provided a new English translation, as Walter Hilse’s widely used 
one in The Music Forum mistranslates certain terms essential to the intellectual 
background of the treatise.7)
Tractatus compositionis augmentatus
Q. D. B. V. [Quod Deus bene vertat.]
Das 1ste Capitel
Vom Contrapuncte insgemein
1)  Die Composition ist eine Wissenschaft aus 
wohl gegen einander gesetzten Con- und 
Dissonantiis einen harmonischen Contra-
punct zu setzen.
2)  Ist also der Zweck der Composition die 
 Harmonia oder Wohl-Laut mehrerer und 
unterschiedener Stimmen, welches die 
Musici einen Contrapunct heißen, weilen vor 
Alters und vor Erfindung derer itzt 
üblichen Noten anstatt derselben nur 
Puncte gebraucht worden; daher also durch 
solche Puncta angedeutete zwey oder 
mehrere Stimmen Contrapunct genannt 
worden. Könnte nach etlicher Meynung 
besser ein Contrasonus genannt werden.
3)  Die Materia solches Contrapuncts sind 
Con- und Dissonantien, doch unter denen 
letztern nur Diejenigen, welche aus 
Einthei lung der Octave in ihre Tonos und 
Semitonia herrühren, nicht aber die 
übrigen, so unnatürlich, und also der 
Harmonie zuwider sind.
The 1st Chapter
On Counterpoint in general
1)  Composition is a science of setting a 
harmonic counterpoint from consonances 
and dissonances well counterpoised.
2)  It is thus the goal of composition [to 
make] a harmony or concord of several 
and diverse voices, which musicians 
called a counterpoint, for long ago, 
before the invention of the now 
common notes, points were used; and 
thus the two or more voices indicated 
through such points were named 
counterpoint. According to the opinion 
of many, it could better be called a 
contrasonus.
3)  The materials of such counterpoint are 
consonances and dissonances, though 
among the latter only those that derive 
from the division of the octave in its 
tones and semitones, not however the 
others, so unnatural, and thus contrary 
to harmony.
7 Fitting out the 17th-century text with 20th-century Anglo-American Schenkerian terminology, 
Hilse translates the first sentence of the Tractatus as »Composition is a science which erects a harmonious 
contrapuntal structure out of well-disposed consonances and dissonances.« Subsequently, Bernhard’s 
Aristotelian terms materia and forma are translated as »building blocks« and »beauty« respectively.  Walter 
HILSE, The Treatises of Christoph Bernhard, in The Music Forum 3, ed. William J. Mitchell and Felix 
Salzer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 31. All translations from Bernhard are my own.
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4)  Die Forma besteht in der künstl[ichen] 
Abwechselung und Vermengung solcher 
Con- und Dissonantzen, also in Observation 
der General und Special Regeln des 
Contrapuncts, als aus deren 
unterschiedlichen Brauch und natürlichen 
Influentz es herrühret, daß eine 
Composition gut, die andere aber besser ist, 
die minder oder mehr vergnüget und den 
Authorem berühmt macht.
4)  The form lies in the artistic alternation 
and combination of such consonances 
and dissonances, thus in the observation 
of the general and special rules of 
counterpoint, for from their diverse use 
and natural influence it results that one 
composition is good, another however 
even better, pleasing either less or 
more and making the author famous.
In this brief chapter, Bernhard touched on two aspects of the theoretical 
 autonomy of music. While, at the most basic level, the mere definition of musical 
terms and rules set aside musical processes as belonging to a common order, and 
thus implied a general theoretical autonomy, the reference to the »composition« 
as a self-sufficient whole implied a specific type of theoretical autonomy, the 
structural autonomy and coherence of the work. »Coherence« here is used in a 
broad sense. It does not necessary imply a harmonious unity of parts and whole, 
but rather merely states that there is some definable relationship between them.
With terms such as »consonance« and »dissonance,« as self-evident as they 
may seem, Bernhard laid out the first elements for a concept of theoretical 
 autonomy. To regulate and control the movement between dissonances and 
 consonances, he could rely on the »general and special rules of counterpoint« as a 
type of rule which applies only to music. Through them, he could conceptualize 
and manipulate sound as if it followed its own laws. By defining a »science« (a 
body of practical knowledge) that dealt with such laws, a theorist defined a world 
of specifically musical operations. For Bernhard, the rules of composition  included 
not only consonance and dissonance treatment, but also principles such as mode, 
canonic artifice, and cadence. Since at least the Musica enchiriadis,8 musicians have 
relied on this body of specifically musical terms as they seek to mold their music, 
and this definition of a vocabulary provides the foundation for the theoretical 
autonomy of music, the sense that tones can be arranged such that they seem to 
have a life of their own.
However, it is vitally important to recognize this level of the specifically 
 musical as formed by human intentions. »Consonance« and »dissonance,« for 
 instance, may seem to represent purely musical categories, but they register, as all 
musical terms must do, the meeting of mind and world. As David Cohen has 
noted, Carolingian theorists of organum invoked metaphysical ideals to ground 
8 See Hans Heinrich EGGEBRECHT, Die Mehrstimmigkeitslehre von ihren Anfängen bis zum 12. 
Jahrhundert, in Die Mittelalterliche Lehre von der Mehrstimmigkeit, Geschichte der Musiktheorie (Darm-
stadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984).
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the priority of consonance over dissonance in such texts as the Musica enchiriadis.9 
Bernhard did not explicitly distinguish between consonance and dissonance in 
such terms, but did dismiss all non-standard intervals (those outside the diatonic 
scale) as »unnatural.«10 At times, the terminology only shows its aesthetic dimen-
sions in context. Bernhard began the nuts and bolts of his discussion with a list of 
intervals, always treated as simultaneities. However, as Werner Braun has noted, 
musicians use the term »interval« to designate varying musical phenomena.11 A 
simultaneous dyad is different from the distance between melodically displaced 
tones, and the interval of a third, say, within the course of a single phrase has a 
different quality from the third that separates the cadential note of one phrase 
from the upbeat of the next. The term »interval« always brings assumptions about 
the temporal nature of music into play. Such cultural values always attend the 
production or reception of music processes. But in order to manipulate or to 
 understand such processes, it is necessary to describe musical relations as if they 
were theoretically autonomous. At the same time, the socially determined thought 
of any single person should not be treated as the meaning of the musical  processes, 
for they are »underdetermined,« as the saying goes. The music articulates time 
and moves through affective spheres in ways that no single description,  theoretical 
or poetic, can exhaust.12 While composers cannot avoid drawing upon their 
 culturally defined experiences as they manipulate musical processes, just as 
 recipients cannot avoid experiencing the music in culturally defined ways, the 
music will invariably carry different meanings for different people. The  theoretical 
autonomy of musical process lies not in any absence of meaning, but rather in the 
indeterminacy of meaning.
To describe the theoretical autonomy of musical processes is not, however, to 
define the autonomy of the musical work, or »composition« as Bernhard wrote. The 
theoretical autonomy of musical terms and processes became important early in 
Western musical traditions. The structural autonomy of musical works is a  second 
9 David E. COHEN, Metaphysics, Ideology, Discipline: Consonance, Dissonance, and the Foun-
dations of Western Polyphony, Theoria 7 (1993). The most famous instances of the imbrication of 
music-theoretical terminology with cultural presuppositions involve the gender duality of the sonata 
form, pointed out by Carl DAHLHAUS, Ästhetische Prämissen der ‘Sonatenform’ bei Adolf 
 Bernhard Marx, Archiv für Musikwissenschaft 41, no. 2 (1984); Susan McCLARY, Narrative Agendas 
in ‘Absolute’ Music: Identity and Difference in Brahms’s Third Symphony, in Musicology and Difference: 
Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship, ed. Ruth Solie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993);  Marcia J. CITRON, Gender and the Musical Canon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 132-45.
10 Joseph MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed. Die Kompositionslehre Heinrich Schützens in der Fassung seines 
Schülers Christoph Bernhard, 3rd ed. (Kassel: Bärenreiter,1999), 40. 
11 Ibid., 43-44. W. BRAUN, Deutsche Musiktheorie: Von Calvisius bis Mattheson, 170.
12 On the varying insights made possible by different types of music-theoretical terminology, see 
Carl DAHLHAUS, Der rhetorische Formbegriff H. Chr. Kochs und die Theorie der Sonatenform, 
 Archiv für Musikwissenschaft 35, no. 3 (1978).
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and more narrow type of theoretical autonomy, one that came historically later and 
that depended even more upon social practices and aesthetic ideas than the theo-
retical autonomy of musical processes. Although the structural autonomy of works 
was not the essential concern that it became in the 19th and 20th centuries, Bernhard 
still was sensitive to it. Rhetoric provided him the means to discuss works.
Like other German theorists before him, Bernhard borrowed the word »com-
position« from rhetoric, using it in two senses: as the activity of combining tones 
together, and as the result of the activity.13 In the opening definition of the topic of 
his treatise, he used the term in its first sense, as an activity. The activity of 
 composition is a craft or science (Wissenschaft) that proceeds according to rules. 
»Composition is a science of setting a harmonic counterpoint from consonances and 
 dissonances well counterpoised. It is thus the goal of composition [to make] a harmony 
or concord of several and diverse voices, which musicians called a counterpoint.« He 
shifted his focus from the activity to the result in the last paragraph. »It results that 
one composition is good, another however even better.« To a large extent, the two 
faces of the word »composition« crystallize an essential issue in scholarship on the 
work concept. How do musicians think about the activity of composition (the 
 performance of a task) as separate from the result (the work or artifact)?
As a good student of Aristotle, Bernhard emphasized the productive activity of 
composition above all, an activity that required the broad principle of theoretical 
autonomy but not necessarily the narrower one of structural autonomy.  Science 
(Wissenschaft) was not abstract knowledge, but rather pragmatic knowledge 
 necessary to accomplish a goal. At the same time, Bernhard also thought about the 
result (the work or artifact). As many scholars have noted, musicians from the 
 Renaissance onward did think about repeatable works, often drawing on the 
 treatises on rhetoric by Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle.14 In 1537 Listenius  famously 
distinguished the result-oriented poetic music from both activity-oriented  theoretical 
13 While musicians at first focused on composition as an activity, but began to emphasize the 
 result as soon as they began to comment on the novelty of the result. Markus BRANDUR, Composi-
tio/Komposition, in Handwörterbuch der musikalischen Terminologie, ed. Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht 
 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1972), 23-24.
14 On the use of the work concept before 1800, see Peter BENARY, Die deutsche Kompositionslehre des 
18. Jahrhunderts, ed. Heinrich Besseler, Jenaer Beiträge zur Musikforschung, no. 3 (Leipzig: VEB Breit-
kopf und Härtel, 1961), 18; Hans Heinrich EGGEBRECHT, Opusmusik, in Musikalisches Denken:  Aufsätze 
zur Theorie und Ästhetik der Musik, Taschenbücher zur Musikwissenschaft, no. 46 (Wilhelmshaven: 
Heinrichshofen’s Verlag, 1977); Bonnie J. BLACKBURN, On Compositional Process in the Fifteenth 
 Century, Journal of the American Musicological Society 40, no. 2 (1987); Wilhelm SEIDEL, Werk und  Werk-
begriff in der Musikgeschichte, Erträge der Forschung, no. 246 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
 Buchgesellschaft, 1987), 1-8; Peter CAHN, Zur Vorgeschichte des ‘Opus perfectum et absolutum’ in der 
Musikauffassung um 1500, in Zeichen und Struktur in der Musik der Renaissance: Ein Symposium aus Anlaß 
der Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Musikforschung Münster (Westfalen) 1987, ed. Klaus  Hortschansky 
 (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1989); Walter WIORA, Das musikalische Kunstwerk der Neuzeit und das musische 
Kunstwerk der Antike, in Das musikalische Kunstwerk: Geschichte, Ästhetik, Theorie. Festschrift Carl Dahlhaus 
zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Hermann Danuser, et al. (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag, 1988).
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and practical music, directed toward knowing and doing respectively. Poetic music 
»consists of making or putting together more in this work which afterwards leaves 
the work perfect and absolute, which otherwise is artificially like the dead. Hence, 
the poetic musician is one who is trained in leaving something more in his achieve-
ment.«15 
Despite this famous definition, the existence of a work concept in the Renais-
sance has been challenged. Heinz von Loesch has argued that Listenius primarily 
used the rhetorical terminology simply to invoke a mode of thought [Denkform], 
not to describe their musical practice. As Loesch puts it,
The use of the Aristotelian and Quintilianian terminology is not a means to an end, 
but rather an end in itself. In other words, the substance of the concept of »musica 
poetica« consists not in the formulation of a modern concept of composition or work, 
but rather in the transfer (transformation) of an Aristotelian-Quintilianian figure of 
thought into the realm of music. In the process something emerges, to a certain extent 
accidentally, that corresponds to our work concept.16
To exemplify this foreign mode of thought, he argues that the »musical work« 
in Listenius’s original formulation (in the Rudimenta musicae of 1533) applied 
 primarily to works of music theory.17 While he notes that composition (rather than 
theory) increasingly dominated the discussion of musical »making« over the course 
of the 16th and 17th centuries,18 Bernhard would still have found the blurred line 
between music theory and composition familiar. The Tractatus itself is as much a 
»work« as Bernhard’s own music. In its neat division into chapters and parts, it had 
internal integrity. And it had temporal durability—Johann Mattheson still referred 
to it in the Vollkommene Capellmeister (1739). By rationalizing compositional practice, 
Bernhard gave the Tractatus the closed quality of an independent whole.
15 Nicolas LISTENIUS, Music (Musica), trans. Albert Seay (Colorado Springs: Colorado College 
Music Press, 1975), 3.
16 »Die Anwendung der aristotelischen und quintilianschen Begrifflichkeit ist nicht Mittel zum 
Zweck, sie ist Selbstzweck. Mit anderen Worten: Das substantielle Moment am Begriff der ‘Musica 
poetica’ besteht nicht in der Formulierung eines neuzeitlichen Kompositions- und Werkbegriffs, es 
besteht in der Übertragung (Transformation) einer aristotelisch-quintilianschen Denkfigur in den 
 Bereich der Musik, bei der sich, gewissermaßen akzidentell, etwas ergibt, das unserem Werkbegriff 
entspricht.« Heinz von LOESCH, Der Werkbegriff in der protestantischen Musiktheorie des 16. und 17. 
 Jahrhunderts: Ein Mißverständnis, ed. Thomas Ertelt, Studien zur Geschichte der Musiktheorie, no. 1 
 (Hildesheim: Olms, 2001), 95-96.
17 ———, Musica–Musica practica–Musica poetica, in Deutsche Musiktheorie des 15. bis 17. Jahr-
hunderts: Erster Teil. Von Paulmann bis Calvisius, Geschichte der Musiktheorie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftli-
che Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 122-23. See also P. CAHN, »Zur Vorgeschichte des ‘Opus perfectum et 
absolutum’«, Heinz von LOESCH, ’Musica’ und ‘opus musicum’: Zur Frühgeschichte des musikali-
schen Werkbegriffs, in Musikwissenschaft zwischen Kunst, Ästhetik und Experiment. Festschrift Helga de la 
Motte zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Reinhard Kopiez (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998).
18 Ibid., 105-06. Glarean’s list of composers represents a historical turning point for Loesch.
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But if Bernhard did think about the Tractatus as a theoretical »work,« he also 
offered the same category to practicing composers and musicians. In this  respect, 
the »composition« was the result, a whole that could be judged and could 
 transcend the immediate occasion of the setting. To see the shift in emphasis from 
the activity of composition to the composed result, it is necessary to read carefully 
his statements on the purpose of composition, again borrowed from rhetoric. In 
other words, by referring to aesthetic and social issues, Bernhard integrated the 
notion of the composed work into the foundations of his theoretical remarks.
For Bernhard, a composed work could be separated from its performance. As 
he wrote in the last sentence of the first chapter, the skillful and differentiated use 
of counterpoint meant [quote] »that one composition is good, another however 
even better, pleasing either less or more and making the author famous.« The claim 
to fame might seem smug in a learned work on counterpoint, were it not a fixed 
topos of rhetoric and poetry, ancient and modern.19 To take only one example, 
Horace, in the Ars Poetica, wrote that the expert piece of writing will »cross the sea 
and extend to a distant day the author’s fame.«20 But the statement was more than 
a rhetorical formula, as it described aesthetic and social practices in order to 
 denote the structural autonomy of the work. Of course, Bernhard did not specify 
the public with which the author would win his fame—it could have been the 
 immediate audience of a Capellmeister’s court no less than transmaritime publics, 
and thus the fame resulting from performances rather than works. Nonetheless, 
the rhetorical trope suggests an ideal of wide distribution. And for a composition 
to be distributed, it needed to be treated as a result of compositional activity, not 
simply the activity itself. The rhetorical terms evoke a musical practice in which 
musicians separated between work and performance. Bernhard did this again in 
the later parts of his treatise when he named works by Italian and German 
 contemporaries and predecessors.21 The pieces were models of style. They 
 exemplified imitable principles of part writing, not the inimitable qualities that 
Romantics looked for in their canons of works. That said, even if Bernhard cited 
works as exempla, rather than aesthetic entities, works such as Palestrina’s motet 
Ad te levari animam meam had the rudimentary structural autonomy that allowed 
them to cross mountains, if not seas.22
Today, the structural autonomy of a work has become more a matter of 
 aesthetics than of theory. It has become a question of reception, related to how a 
piece of music is treated rather than how it is constructed. As Peter Bürger has 
19 Ernst Robert CURTIUS, Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter, 11th ed. (Bern:  Francke, 
1993), 469-70.
20 HORACE, Satires, Epistles, and Ars poetica, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Rev. ed., Loeb  Classical 
Library (Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1932), 479.
21 J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed., Kompositionslehre, 90.
22 Bernhard cites Palestrina’s motet as an example of modal extension. Ibid., 106.
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noted, the institution of art is so strong that even avant-garde anti-art has its place 
in the museum.23 Yet in order for the principles of aesthetic autonomy to arise, 
musicians needed to develop their expertise in the manipulation of sound, the 
province of theory. While one can treat any piece as aesthetically autonomous, as 
19th-century musicians did when they performed age-old liturgical works in their 
concert halls and theaters, musicians would not have done so in the first place if 
they had not been able to rely upon musical processes to create structural coher-
ence. They had to step from the general theoretical autonomy of musical processes 
to a more specific structural autonomy of a musical work. Here, musicians needed 
to borrow the rhetorical terminology and its aesthetic values to develop certain 
types of musical processes—in particular harmony (or counterpoint) and cadence—
among the range of those treated as theoretically autonomous. They could, in other 
words, enlarge the realm of the general theoretical autonomy of music by drawing 
upon the principle of structural autonomy established in rhetoric.
There is a central term in Bernhard’s first chapter that fills out his concept of 
the composition: harmony. This term offered, among other things, a normative 
criterion to judge the success of the work, and it thereby gave substance to the 
fame Bernhard prized. As musicians in distant cities or across seas would not 
necessarily hear a performance of a work, and thus not be able to judge the effect 
on an audience, »harmony« provided those in the profession a standard by which 
they might judge its quality. The term was especially useful, as it denoted empiri-
cal, religious, and theoretical aspects of the music, as the situation demanded. It 
also could complement more specific conceptions of a musical work as a type of 
musical discourse.24 At the empirical level, harmony described the pleasurable 
sensations that a listener felt. »It is thus the goal of composition [to make] a harmony 
or concord of several and diverse voices. . . . [The composition is] pleasing either 
less or more.« »Harmony« is here the sound of pleasant concord. On a theological 
plane, some of Bernhard’s compatriots, both earlier and later, considered music as 
a divine science. Johann Gottfried Walther, for instance, wrote around 1708 that 
»Music is a heavenly-philosophical science, grounded in particular in mathematics, 
that deals with sound insofar as a good and artistic harmony or concord can be 
brought forth from it.«25 
But »harmony« could describe something else beside empirical sensation 
and theological ideal. At the theoretical level, it was a term that could designate 
23 Peter BÜRGER, Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw, Theory and History of Litera-
ture, no. 4 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 57. 
24 See, for example, Daniel HARRISON, Rhetoric and Fugue: An Analytical Application, Music 
Theory Spectrum 12, no. 1 (1990).
25 »Die Music ist eine himmlisch-philosophische, und sonderlich auf Mathesin sich gründende 
Wißenschaft, welche umgehet mit dem Sono, so fern aus selbigen eine gute und künstl. Harmonie oder 
Zusammenstimmung hervor zubringen.« Johann Gottfried WALTHER, Praecepta der musicalischen 
Composition, ed. Peter Benary (Leipzig: VEB Breitkopf und Härtel, 1955), 13.
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the concordance of parts as a whole, and in particular the rules by which two or 
more voices could combine into a counterpoint.
»It is thus the goal of composition [to make] a harmony or concord of several and  diverse 
voices, which musicians called a counterpoint. . . . The form lies in the artistic alternation 
and combination of such consonances and dissonances, thus in the observation of the 
 general and special rules of counterpoint, for from their diverse use and natural influence 
it results that one composition is good, another however even better.«26
Thus, Bernhard furnished his readers with a normative category that, at a 
minimal level, marked off musical works as discrete entities. Harmony could 
 designate the confluence of musical processes that, at least in the late 17th century, 
was necessary to distinguish »compositions« from their performances.  »Harmony« 
could point to structural autonomy.
The centerpiece of Bernhard’s notion of structural autonomy is counterpoint. 
Invoking Aristotelian terminology, he defined the »materials« as consonances and 
dissonances, the »form« as »the artistic [künstlich] alternation and combination of 
such consonances and dissonances.« He emphasized both the interrelationship 
 between musical materials, and the idea that there were certain principles that 
governed their behavior: the composer attended to the rules of art and craft to put 
the consonances together. Together, these materials and principles bind the music 
together into the first foundations of a coherent entity. Later, in his discussion of 
the rhetorical figures, the integrity of the contrapuntal texture, the »concord of 
several and diverse voices,« provided the point of departure for the expressive 
use of dissonance. Thus, the »whole« provided by the harmony lay in the local 
interactions between of intervals and melodies. Polyphonic texture (rather than 
form, as in the 19th century) was the foundation for Bernhard’s concept of 
 structural autonomy.27
But, in the course of the treatise, he did often refer to parameters that might 
give a work some large-scale coherence. The first, and most important, was the 
text. As Bernhard noted, in order to compose a melodic line easy to sing, it was 
important »that text and notes rhyme well with each other.«28 Although he spoke 
in this context primarily of the correct setting of prosody, by implication the  poetic 
structure of the text would have primacy in determining the structure of the work. 
26 J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed., Kompositionslehre, 40.
27 In his attention to texture, Bernhard did little to intimate any knowledge of principles of work 
integration as they are conceived today. He touched on neither formal schemata nor other principles 
of large-scale coherence, such as the Schenkerian Ursatz. »Form« was merely the complement to the 
category of »substance.«
28 »Zu solchem Ende dienet vornehmlich, daβ Text und Noten sich wohl zusammen reimen, denn 
es kann sonst geschehen, daβ noten, so an sich selbst eine gute Melodie haben, durch Unterlegung des 
Textes übel lauten, und also im Gegentheil.« J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed., Kompositionslehre, 40.
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Musical processes, after all, are not the only means to establish structural autonomy, 
and it is all too easy to overlook the properties of texts and narratives. Words and 
ideas can contribute to the structural coherence of a composition no less than musi-
cal processes, providing both the coherence of a narrative or lyrical theme as well as 
a formal coherence through rhyme schemes and other verbal structures. Finally, the 
interaction between text and music, as through the sensitive application of figures, 
can define the structural autonomy of a work as well as musical processes.
Second, mode could function as a control. Bernhard differentiated, for exam-
ple, between »common« [gewöhnlich] and »rare« [seltsam] transpositions of mode 
(between those by fifth or fourth, and those by other intervals)—a distinction that 
would later turn into the system of close and distant key relations.29 That said, he 
did not presuppose mode as a means of harmonic unity, as key would become. 
Among the five manipulations of mode (transpositio, consociatio, aequatio, extensio, 
and alteratio), Bernhard allowed pieces to begin and end in different modes (altera-
tio), a musical procedure inimical to later conceptions of tonal unity. While he was 
certainly conscious of other strategies, as his own works suggest (e.g., sectional 
 divisions and the alternations between vocal and instrumental passages, as well as 
those between soloist and ensemble), he saw no need to discuss them.
2. Aesthetic Autonomy: Judgment
If rhetoric allowed Bernhard to conceptualize the theoretical autonomy of 
music (both the autonomy of musical processes and the structural autonomy of 
the work), it also allowed him to think about music not just as a means to an end 
(as functional), but also as an end itself (as aesthetically autonomous). Like all 
 others of his time, if pressed he probably would have been quite happy to point 
out the usefulness of his art. In the church, music enhanced religious devotion; in 
the court and city, it honored authority; in the collegium musicum and other  intimate 
settings, it provided an excuse for conviviality and furthered moral formation; 
and in private festivities, it adorned the proceedings and acted as a mark of 
 distinction. He armed his readers with the theoretical precepts necessary to 
achieve these ends through the rhetorical concept of style, elaborated in chapter 
forty-three of the Tractatus. Although he did not mention it explicitly, genre would 
have been no less important to his compatriots, and was also a fixed part of 
 rhetoric. Yet when Bernhard noted in the first chapter that the goal of the  composer 
was to »please,« he saw no need to bind it to any one of these purposes.30 The 
central position assigned to pleasure—at the very head of the treatise—is a sign 
that Bernhard had some notion of aesthetic autonomy.
29 Ibid., 97.
30 Ibid., 40.
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Aesthetic autonomy involves the postulate that music can be judged according 
to qualitative criteria that abstract from stated purposes. A work or a performance 
can be considered as an end rather than a means. To be an end, the work or 
 performance elicits some powerful experience from the recipient that gives it self-
sufficiency (described by »aesthetic« terms such as pleasing, beautiful, sublime, 
grotesque, and so forth), but also takes place within some social practice in which 
participants are likely to value such experiences as of a class of their own. Two 
caveats are necessary. First, as people always conceive of their actions in terms of 
a hierarchy of personal and collective goals, the traditional language of aesthetic 
autonomy is slightly misleading. To practice music »for its own sake« is not so 
much to put oneself in the service of a musical work, as the literal meaning of the 
phrase suggests, but rather to treat music as contributing in a direct way to the 
final goals of life, whatever they may be for a particular person or society. As one 
distinguishes between practices in which music is treated as an end (as autono-
mous) and those in which it is treated as a means to some further end (as 
 functional), it would be more accurate to speak of a hierarchy of ends, some of 
which are more directly linked to ideals of the good life than others. To treat  music 
»as an end« is to say that it brings human beings close to their ideals of »the good 
life.« The terminology of ends and means is still useful, and will be used in this 
article, as it allows one to differentiate clearly between the different types of 
 functions these two practices have. Second, aesthetic autonomy does not imply 
that a work cannot also serve as a means to some further end, but only that it can 
be judged as if it were independent. Thus, as a particular practice of judgment is 
essential to the principle of aesthetic autonomy, it is impossible to separate social 
issues from aesthetic ones. For the sake of clarity, the third and fourth sections will 
treat both of these caveats as it turns to the practices and institutions essential to 
aesthetic autonomy. This section will focus on types of judgments and its link 
with the rhetorical concepts of music.
With words of exemplary precision, if often misunderstood, Immanuel Kant 
isolated the centrality of judgment when he described the pure judgment of taste 
as based on a sense of purposiveness without a goal. Although he wrote a century 
later than Bernhard, Kant articulated distinctions that were not foreign to the 17th 
century, and his distinction between judgments based on intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties is thus worthy of treatment. Other more controversial elements of 
Kant’s theory of judgment can be passed over, notably the universal claim of the 
subjective judgment of taste, and the strict distinction between, on the one hand, 
agreeable pleasure derived from the senses, and, on the other, the aesthetic pleas-
ure produced by the free play between the understanding and the imagination. 
There are features of Kant’s theory that make it eminently applicable to 17th- 
and 18th-century practice. For instance, he offered a theory of aesthetic autonomy 
that acknowledged the importance of function and purpose for art. Any work of 
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human making would primarily have »adherent beauty« derived from its suit-
ability to a particular end. This was in essence a theory of decorum, a rhetorical 
principle of ancient provenance. Kant insisted that art needed a moral purpose, for 
it should serve humanity as served as a means of acculturation. By contrast, nature 
provided examples of »free beauty,« of »purposiveness without an end,« for it was 
impossible for the finite consciousness of human beings to ascertain any divine 
plan. He did not maintain this distinction between works of art and works of nature 
strictly, for he also noted that certain works of human art and artifice, especially 
arabesques and »music fantasias (without a theme), indeed all instrumental music,« 
offered correlates of human making.31 It was precisely their free beauty and lack of 
clear moral purpose that made them questionable in his eyes and ears.
But Kant’s was a theory of judgment, not of art and certainly not of l’art pour 
l’art. If an artwork served moral ends, it could nonetheless be judged according to 
the criteria of free beauty. Kant argued that the »judgment of taste« could be 
 differentiated from the judgment of the propriety of an object with respect to its 
end.
A judgment of taste in regard to an object with a determinate internal end would thus 
be pure only if the person making the judgment either had no concept of this end or 
abstracted from it in his judgment. But in that case, although this person would have 
made a correct judgment of taste, in that he would have judged the object as a free 
 beauty, he would nevertheless be criticized and accused of a false taste by someone else, 
who considered beauty in the object only as an adherent property (who looked to the 
end of the object), even though both judge correctly in their way: the one on the basis of 
what he has before his sense, the other on the basis of what he has in his  thoughts. By 
means of this distinction one can settle many disputes about beauty between judges of 
taste, by showing them that the one is concerned with free beauty, the other with 
 adherent beauty, the first making a pure, the second an applied  judgment of taste.32
As the basis for the judgment of taste lies in the »inner perfection« of the 
work (something intuited rather than conceptually articulated), rather than in the 
»external perfection« (its suitability to its end), Kant isolated the aesthetic quality 
of a work from its purpose. This was a theoretical separation, as Kant was well 
aware. Art could be judged aesthetically, even though the mere fact of aesthetic 
value did not in any way keep it from being useful as well. There were simply two 
different criteria of judgment.
In the late 17th century, it would have been difficult for musicians (amateur 
or professional) or listeners to articulate such distinctions. Nonetheless, there are 
31 Immanuel KANT, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, trans. 
Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 114.
32 Ibid., 115-16.
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numerous signs that musicians and connoisseurs did isolate the intrinsic quality 
from the extrinsic purpose of works. As noted, in the Tractatus, Bernhard isolated 
the pleasure provided by a composition (chapter one) from the issue of purpose 
(transmitted indirectly through the concept of style in chapter forty-three). Much 
later, in his prefatory recommendation of Johann Theile’s Pars Prima Missarum 4. 
& 5. Vocum (1673), Bernhard punned that he had recently viewed »a part« [einen 
Theil] of Theile’s masses, and that it »had especially delighted« him [sonderlich 
 ergetzet habe].33 While his remark spun with publicistic vim, there is no reason to 
doubt that the music did give Bernhard pleasure. The extreme attitudes of 
 composers are also in part a sign of their dedication to intrinsic qualities of works. 
As evidence of a Baroque interest in »aesthetic experience,« Harry White has 
rightly called attention to J. S. Bach’s pride in and engagement with counterpoint, 
out of proportion to the liturgical functions of the music.34
When Bernhard noted his pleasure in Theile’s works, he referred to a quite 
specific type of pleasure, one that derived in part from his ability to judge the 
works. In order to be judged an end in itself, musicians or listeners must be able 
to focus their pleasure and attention on a specific work or event, and have the 
habit of doing so. For instance, 17th-century composers such as Bernhard could 
focus on musical processes, while amateurs could focus on the skill with which 
moral ideas were made musically manifest. In each case, the recipient would have 
had material for a pure judgment—they could have judged the skill of the 
 composer or performer—even if they also judged a work in terms of its adherent 
beauty—its appropriateness to its purpose, professional or ethical. In each case, 
the recipients could classify certain types of works or events as belonging together, 
and develop rules of art that both instructed practitioners and guided judges. 
These objective conditions required a practice and contexts in which people would 
actually link certain types of works or events as governed by its own principles. 
The meetings of composers and humanists provided such contexts.
To negotiate the twin demands of pleasure and purpose, musicians could 
again draw on rhetoric. Style and genre offered easy points of mediation on two 
interrelated issues that faced musicians: between autonomy and functionality, on 
the one hand, and between the rules of art and the contexts within which music 
was created and received, on the other. While style and genre are linked to 
 purposes, they also offered musicians material upon which they could exercise 
their judgments. In its origin, the rhetorical principle of style was based on a 
 principle of decorum, that is, of fitness of a particular literary or compositional type 
to a particular situation. As music in Bernhard’s time was composed primarily for 
particular purposes, a creative musician could reckon with a number of clearly 
33 Bernhard’s »Sendschreiben« is reprinted as an appendix in Wolfgang HORN, Die Kompositi-
onslehre Christoph Bernhards in ihrer Bedeutung für einen Schüler, Schütz-Jahrbuch 17 (1995): 118.
34 Harry WHITE, ’If It’s Baroque, Don’t Fix It’: Reflections on Lydia Goehr’s ‘Work-Concept’ and 
the Historical Integrity of Musical Composition, Acta musicologica 69, no. 1 (1997): 103.
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 prescribed situations with set constraints. Church music required a solemn style, 
while weddings and birthdays demanded an extroverted one. Such distinctions in 
character grounded Bernhard’s distinction between stylus gravis and stylus  luxurians, 
and helped to define the function of particular works. In a similar way, genres were 
also linked to particular uses and principles of decorum.
Despite the firm links between music and stated uses, the reduction of various 
types of festivity and social gatherings to ritualized types allowed composers to 
stylize the techniques they used in their occasional works. The luxuriant style of 
figural counterpoint, for instance, not only gave works an exuberance that helped 
them achieve their end, but the style also could be treated as an end in its own right. 
Musicians could take pleasure in an artful display of craft and knowledge, as 
 Bernhard expressed with respect to Theile’s masses. Thus, on the one hand, stylistic 
and generic norms allowed composers to communicate more effectively with an 
audience. They were rhetorical. On the other, they represented a self-conscious 
 artistry that could be manipulated and refined. Means (the skillful cultivation of the 
luxuriant style of counterpoint) could vie with ends (for instance, the bestowal of 
distinction upon a wedding or birthday), and thereby become an end in themselves. 
If occasional works were functional, they also allowed musicians to show their 
 talents in a particular genre, to compete with past masters, and, if their composi-
tions were felicitous, to offer new exempla to later generations.
Style and genre, then, aided both the functionality and the aesthetic  autonomy 
of music. On the one hand, they codified standard uses of music through the 
 conventions of style and genre. On the other, they tended toward a potential 
 autonomy from these purposes by allowing composers to manipulate these 
 conventions. These two tendencies are not mutually exclusive, and can even 
 comfortably coexist if the composer stays within certain boundaries.
It is a general tendency in practices of rhetoric for style and genre to become 
valued for their own sake, rather than simply as means to an end. From antiquity 
onward, rhetoricians were concerned not just with functional speech (political or 
judicial persuasion), but also with narration and the rules of art themselves. In his 
survey of rhetoric, George Kennedy has distinguished between primary and 
 secondary rhetoric. While primary rhetoric found its application in speech acts 
(or, applied to music, in particular performances), secondary rhetoric was 
 manifested in discourse and art forms without an explicitly persuasive function. 
Kennedy notes that the shift from primary to secondary rhetoric is a persistent 
tendency in the history of the discipline. It has been called letturaturizzazione, »the 
tendency of rhetoric to shift focus from persuasion to narration, from civic to 
 personal contexts, and from speech to literature, including poetry.«35 Although 
the artistry of secondary rhetoric thrives in a written tradition, as Kennedy notes,36 
35 George A. KENNEDY, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to 
Modern Times, 2nd rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 3.
36 Ibid., McCRELESS, Music and Rhetoric, 849.
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primary and secondary rhetoric differ more in manner than in medium. A speech 
or a musical improvisation can poetically or musically overshoot its purpose, just 
as written poetry and music can be bound by purpose. The North-German 
 tradition of musica poetica hewed closely to the pole of secondary rhetoric, more so 
than the performative Italian traditions of opera and cantata.37
In the 17th century, it was in musicians’ interests to develop style and genre 
both rhetorically (as a means to an end) and with a view to its potential aesthetic 
autonomy (as an end in itself). With conventions of genre and style, composers 
could be sure that their music suited its purpose properly, and that the audience 
understood it an appropriate manner. Linked to the skillful use of technical norms 
(such as mode, fugue, and imitation), genre and style become potential objects of 
critical judgment abstracted from the use of the music. While a piece of liturgical 
music could encourage a devotional attitude when it was performed in a church, 
it could also recommend itself through its sophistication. In Kantian terms, its 
value as liturgical music is the object of an applied judgment, its value as a work 
of art and artifice that of a pure judgment. For example, Palestrina’s Ad te levari 
animam meam served Bernhard less as a piece with a liturgical purpose than as a 
model of excellence in modal extension.38 While good modal extension could 
 further the affective and illustrative power of the work (and thus its ability to 
achieve its function), it also showed the composer’s craft and skill. In general, 
compositional conventions of all types lend themselves to free judgments, first by 
making musical processes available to composers for sophisticated treatment, 
and second by giving recipients a means by which to judge them.
It is true that the particular pleasures afforded by music were linked to moral 
and religious ends, even outside the church. As Johann Kuhnau noted, the  virtuoso 
»can please God quite well if he is willing to let his virtu and the grace God 
 bestowed on him be seen and heard in honest company.«39 As will be  discussed 
below, the moral and religious purposes helped to constitute special types of 
 function linked to humanist and professional institutions. For the moment, it is 
only necessary to note that musicians emphasized the pleasure that their music 
could give, and that it was not necessarily immediately bound to  particular 
 purposes. Indeed, as Rob Wegman has noted, both religious asceticism and 
 moralistic injunctions against the pleasures of music signal a long-standing, 
 widespread, and popular tendency to judge experiences of beauty as without 
 specific purpose.40
37 See R. DAMMANN, Musikbegriff, 104-09; D. BARTEL, Musica Poetica, 59-64.
38 J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed. Kompositionslehre, 106.
39 Johann KUHNAU, The Musical Charlatan, trans. John Raymond Russell (Columbus: Camden 
House, 1997), 162.
40 R.C. WEGMAN, From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low 
Countries, 1450-1500, 454.
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3. Social Autonomy: Institutions and Traditions
If late 17th-century musicians and recipients could draw upon rhetoric to 
manipulate musical processes and to judge skill with the rules of art, they always 
did so as part of distinct practices and traditions. In general, in a ritualized world 
of occasional music, it was not obvious for a person to separate the experience of 
a work per se from the experience of the work as a celebratory or memorial event.41 
There were two traditions that encouraged practices of separation, though with 
approaches that cultivated two different forms of aesthetic autonomy. The first 
was broadly humanist, directed toward the practice of the autonomy of music 
from the necessary demands of daily life, the second narrowly professional and 
focused on the theoretical autonomy of musical processes and works.42 In each 
case, practitioners linked their musical activities to an ideal of the good life, which 
in 17th-century Northern Germany was Lutheran through and through.
First, nobles and educated burghers (especially civil servants, professionals, 
and teachers, but also merchants) cultivated the liberal arts in humanist forms. As 
they separated the arts from utilitarian crafts and sciences, practitioners of the arts 
assigned them a purpose (ethical formation of character) that was deemed  essential 
to inner cultivation and social harmony. To draw this distinction, humanistically 
minded practitioners characterized the arts as ancillary to everyday concerns, as 
Neben-Werck. It was primarily literature and poetry that grounded the humanist, 
ethical education as well as the practice of distinguishing between primary and 
secondary activities. In the preface to his Blumen (1680), Daniel Caspar von 
 Lohenstein, for example, wrote that poetry presented to him »an ennobling way to 
while away the time, but only as a mere ancillary thing, not, by contrast, as a 
 ponderous pursuit.«43 In the literary societies that sprang up in the 17th century, 
such as the Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft, founded in 1617 on the model of the 
 Florentine Accademia della Crusca, cultivators of the arts also had a patriotic mission: 
to create a German literature that might compete with that of Italy. The arts had 
then several explicitly stated uses, but the distinction in types of utility underpinned 
a type of aesthetic autonomy. The arts formed character, provided amusement, 
 enhanced religious devotion, and fostered a sense of national culture, but these 
41 In his definition of aesthetic autonomy as »not merely the expressivity of Fux’s compositions 
as this is recovered by contemporary scholars but the existential force of the music which obtained 
when it was originally performed,« White does not distinguish sufficiently between these two types of 
judgment. H. WHITE, ’If It’s Baroque, Don’t Fix It’, 102n27.
42 This distinction between the autonomy of art and the autonomy of the artwork has been 
 suggested by Peter BÜRGER, Critique of Autonomy, in Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, ed. Michael Kelly 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 174.
43 »Die Poesie habe ihm ‘selbte nur als blosse Neben-dinge einen erleuchternden Zeit-Vertreib/ 
nicht aber eine beschwerliche Bemühung abgegeben.’« As cited by Wilfried BARNER, Barockrhetorik: 
Untersuchungen zu ihren geschichtlichen Grundlagen (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1970), 229-30n55.
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were ends directed inward, not toward the direct accomplishment of everyday 
ends. While the primary tasks of everyday life were seen as necessary parts of life, 
the secondary and ancillary practices devoted to inner cultivation were considered 
ways to cultivate the soul, and thereby to receive grace. For humanists in the 
 Lutheran tradition, it was the inner life that was essential to the pursuit of the good.
If it could provide no competition to literature, music partook in the ancillary 
character of the linguistic arts. The musical institutions that resulted from such 
humanist practices were both courtly and civil in form. In the court, the seigneur 
and courtiers might set aside a certain part of the day and certain chambers in 
their residences (not to mention court theaters) for the enjoyment of music and 
other arts and sciences.44 As a singer and later as a music director at the Saxon 
court in Dresden, Christoph Bernhard participated in such activities, and with his 
Italian training and experiences, brought modernity and worldliness to the court 
through his practice of the arts. In the literary societies (which could include 
 musical performances) and the collegia musica, nobles and burghers could engage 
in artistic pursuits, often using the sense of conviviality developed there to 
 moderate social hierarchies.45 While cantor at St. Johannis in Hamburg from 1664 
to 1674, Christoph Bernhard participated in the collegium musicum founded by 
Matthias Weckmann in 1660. 
This is not to deny the many functions of the arts that were directed outward 
or toward less august ends. The arts served to connote status and distinction in 
the modern world. Nobles used the arts to distance themselves from feudal, 
knightly traditions based on the virtues of bravery and the crafts of war. By 
 cultivating arts whose importance lay in their ancillary character (Neben-Werck), 
nobles could show their sovereign free spirits along lines set out by Italian 
 humanists such as Baldassare Castiglione in Il Cortegiano (1528), and thereby their 
modernity.46 For the bourgeois professionals and educated men, the cultivation of 
44 See Erich REIMER, Die Hofmusik in Deutschland, 1500-1800: Wandlungen einer Institution, 
 Taschenbücher zur Musikwissenschaft, no. 112 (Wilhelmshaven: Noetzel, »Heinrichshofen-Bücher«, 
1991), 95-98; Martin WARNKE, The Court Artist: On the Ancestry of the Modern Artist, trans. David 
 McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
45 On these two institutions, see above all Arnfried EDLER, Das Collegium musicum als Forum 
des Theorie-Praxis-Bezuges, in Akademie und Musik. Erscheinungsweisen und Wirkungen des Akademie-
gedankens in Kultur- und Musikgeschichte: Institutionen, Veranstaltungen, Schriften. Festschrift für Werner 
Braun zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Wolf Frobenius, Nicole Schwindt-Gross, and Thomas Sick, Saarbrücker 
Studien zur Musikwissenschaft, new series no. 7 (Saarbrücken: Saarbrücker Druckerei und Verlag, 1993); 
Klaus Wolfgang NIEMÖLLER, Accademia musicale – musikalische Akademie: Zum Wandel einer 
italienischen Institution im nördlichen Europa bis um 1800, in Akademie und Musik. Erscheinungsweisen 
und Wirkungen des Akademiegedankens in Kultur- und Musikgeschichte: Institutionen, Veranstaltungen, 
Schriften. Festschrift für Werner Braun zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Wolf Frobenius, Nicole Schwindt-Gross, 
and Thomas Sick, Saarbrücker Studien zur Musikwissenschaft, new series no. 7 (Saarbrücken: Saarbrücker 
Druckerei und Verlag, 1993).
46 The memory of feudalism was by no means dead in 17th-century Germany, and many nobles 
viewed the humanist ideals with some suspicion. The Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft permitted the 
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the liberal arts similarly provided both internally and externally directed goods. 
The arts edified and softened the spirit, but also enhanced their social standing 
within a highly stratified society. Some poets were even ennobled for their artistic 
efforts, among them Martin Opitz (1627), Johann Rist (1646), Philipp von Zesen 
(1653), and Sigmund von Birken (1655).47 But if the music had many functions, the 
ones primarily pursued were those ethical and religious goals. Johann Kuhnau 
noted that »from their pleasant harmony« the musicians as a collegium musicum 
»should learn an even, harmonious agreement among their personalities which 
from time to time must prevail among such people.«48
However, the humanist cultivation of the fine arts did not require specialized 
musical knowledge, though many nobles and burghers were practiced as 
 performers, improvisers, or composers. The humanist practice of music as a fine 
art could cover all forms of musical experience, from passive listening to active 
participation to theoretical speculation. While specialized knowledge was not 
 essential to humanist distinctions between necessary and ancillary activities, all of 
which had some purpose that justified their practice, it was important to the 
strong form of aesthetic autonomy in which a recipient makes a judgment that 
abstracts from stated purposes. Specialized knowledge allowed the play of art, 
whether of poetic structures or of musical forms, to attract interest in its own 
right. It also provided a bridge between the theoretical autonomy of musical 
 processes and poetic conventions, on the one hand, and the aesthetic autonomy 
accorded to music as an art, on the other. 
It was primarily the professional musician—the »industrious lover of the 
score« [fleiβiger Partitur Liebhaber], as Bernhard put it—that had the experience 
and the theoretical language that allowed them to think consciously of music’s 
theoretical autonomy.49 He would have been particularly sensitive to this circle of 
connoisseurs, for he belonged to a coterie of professional organists, cantors, and 
Kapellmeister that met in Hamburg and Lübeck in the early 1670s to discuss 
learned counterpoint. Among its participants were Dieterich Buxtehude, Johann 
Adam Reincken, Johann Theile, and probably Matthias Weckmann.50 He was also 
well aware that the »profession« included a canon of »exceptional authors« from 
 membership of learned bourgeois. Some aristocrats took offense at the social mixture and tried to turn 
the society into a knightly order. The protector of the society, Prince Ludwig of Anhalt-Köthen (1579-
1650), responded that the goal of the order was to cultivate virtue and the German language, and 
though knightly deeds were not excluded, they were not the sole purpose. Volker MEID, Literatur des 
Barock, in Deutsche Literaturgeschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2001), 
107-08.
47 W. BARNER, Barockrhetorik, 228-29.
48 J. KUHNAU, The Musical Charlatan, 4.
49 J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed. Kompositionslehre, 107.
50 Kerala J. SNYDER, Dietrich Buxtehude’s Studies in Learned Counterpoint, Journal of the 
 American Musicological Society 33, no. 3 (1980): 562.
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many countries and of long tradition.51 If the tradition of the liberal arts allowed 
humanistically minded amateur musicians and listeners to separate artistic from 
everyday pursuits, the tradition of professionalized composition allowed 
 composers to formulate the internal goals that separated their activities from 
 other crafts and practices.52 For professional musicians, the quality of a work was 
an issue separable from, though of course not unimportant to the purpose of a 
work. Radically stated, the quality of a work was useless, even if a work itself had 
 specific uses, for works of inferior quality could fulfill stated purposes. The 
 musicians aimed at a specifically musical excellence, to speak anachronistically. 
Of course, there were without doubt other functions that the quest for musical 
quality performed, such as the establishment of norms that both constituted the 
profession and excluded others from its ranks; the personal advancement in the 
profession through the recognition by other experts; and so forth.
While Bernhard identified the quality of the work as a primary goal of the 
musicus poeticus, many of his contemporaries assigned their contrapuntal 
 manipulations a mystical function, but in terms that suggest quality and skill as 
primary if hidden goals. The most emphatic statements about the internal goals of 
North-German musicians of Bernhard’s acquaintance or tenor come from those 
who perceived music in alchemic terms. As David Yearsley has noted, the  esoteric 
interest in learned counterpoint and canonic artifice was linked, for some at least, 
to a belief in magic.53 Yet while Heinrich Bokemeyer, Heinrich Buttstett, Johann 
Theile, and Johann Walther were surely convinced that contrapuntal artifices 
were alchemic, it is difficult to imagine that they had much success in their  magic.54 
The real motivation for their activities must rather have lay in the existential 
 pleasure they derived from their own practical and theoretical skill and  knowledge, 
and in the marvels of the harmonious interplay of musical lines. In other words, 
while they thought that they were engaging in a magical activity, they would have 
found little interest in the activity unless they derived a pleasure that would later 
be considered aesthetic from the play with musical processes, so that a de facto 
principle of aesthetic autonomy informed their actions. On the one hand, the 
 alchemic language conferred validity upon the play with the laws of music, that 
51 J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, ed., Kompositionslehre, 90.
52 On the theory of practices, see Alasdair MacINTYRE, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd 
ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 187-90.
53 David YEARSLEY, Bach and the Meanings of Counterpoint, New Perspectives in Music History 
and Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 42-92, esp. 44-48.
54 The efficacy of musical magic has been a matter of debate. While Gary Tomlinson has argued 
that one must not trespass on the beliefs of historical actors—that Ficino’s musical magic »worked”—
Karol Berger has rightly responded that the historian, in a true dialogue with historical actors, must be 
ready to acknowledge the mistakes made by others, as the historical actors are not around to enter the 
dialogue themselves. Gary TOMLINSON, Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 247; Karol BERGER, Contemplating Music  Archeology, 
Journal of Musicology 13, no. 3 (1995): 408-10.
K. Chapin: »A Harmony or Concord of Several 
and Diverse Voices«: Autonomy in 17th-Century 
German Music Theory and Practice
IRASM 42 (2011) 2: 219-255
240
is, a play within the world circumscribed by the theoretical autonomy of music. 
On the other, the pleasurable workings of »the music itself« gave rhyme and 
 reason to the high-flung metaphysics of counterpoint. The metaphysics are 
 important as a sign of these musicians’ hierarchies of goals. Through its power, 
music could trump other types of activities. It was essential to their identities and 
to their life. In this, at least, even composers of a less speculative bent would  surely 
have concurred.
To pursue music as an end in itself, musicians in the 17th century needed 
 institutions that would allow them a certain degree of social autonomy. Bernhard 
worked in both of the primary institutions open to German musicians in the 17th 
century, in a church (as cantor of St. Johannis in Hamburg) and in a court (as 
singer, Vice-Capellmeister, and later Capellmeister for the Kurfürst of Saxony in 
Dresden). For these institutions, he performed, directed, and wrote music that 
served particular uses. But court and church also supported a further institution 
in which the music could be its own goal. Trained, professional musicians with 
both practical and theoretical knowledge made up a »Musical Republic,« as 
 Johann David Heinichen termed it in 1728, which, especially by that time, had all 
the internal quarrels characteristic of the Republic of Letters.55 This Republic was 
in part based on local meetings of the collegium musicum. It was also based on 
 communications between musicians through letters, manuscripts, and theoretical 
works, including Bernhard’s own Tractatus and Heinichen’s Der General-bass in der 
Composition. Whether local or scattered, the Republic served as a professional 
 network. Before becoming the organist at St. Johannis, Weckmann had been a 
student of Heinrich Schütz in Dresden and it is probable that he facilitated his 
friend Bernhard’s move. It was also a means of professional refinement. As  Johann 
Kuhnau noted, such gatherings allowed musicians »to continue to improve 
 themselves in their splendid profession.«56 Composers communicated with each 
other in order to train each other and to develop their craft. Through such links, 
they could develop specialized knowledge and skills. While their compositional 
 techniques may have been directed ultimately at some further purpose,  com posers 
could posit goals that they and a few talented amateurs alone would have 
 recognized. Their professionalization allowed them to posit goals internal to their 
practices and to take pleasure in the skillful realization of these goals. 
The professional and humanist traditions were not completely isolated from 
each other. Not only did many members of the nobility engage in composition as 
one of their ancillary activities, as mentioned above, but certain uses of music 
permitted more room for composers to engage in artistic play. Musicians had 
greater liberties in courts than churches, at least in musical matters if not in their 
55 Johann David HEINICHEN, Der General-Bass in der Composition, Fac. ed. (Dresden: Author, 
1728; reprint, 1994: Hildesheim, Olms), 2.
56 J. KUHNAU, The Musical Charlatan, 4.
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everyday lives.57 While patronage systems may not have allowed composers full 
social autonomy, patrons often realized the representational value of  sophisticated 
music. The Kurfürst Johann Georg I of Saxony allocated Bernhard a stipend for a 
trip to Venice to study and scout talent. It was in his interest to allow the arts in 
his realm to flower with the most marvelous, most modern, and therefore most 
Italian of musical styles. Thus, a composer could aim for the sophisticated play of 
style and genre that made it possible for music to have some aesthetic autonomy, 
at the same time that patrons could bask in the prestige that this sophistication 
reflected back onto their own courts. In a courtly context, music could represent 
authority simply through the artistry of the work. If they were employed by a 
ruler with a taste for the latest music, musicians could unfold their powers with 
much freedom. By contrast church authorities sometimes complained that the 
complexity of the newest musical styles hindered the devotional purposes of the 
music, either because untrained clerics could not perform the works or because 
the congregation was distracted from the meaning of the text or rite. Moreover, as 
they trained themselves to perform sophisticated music, schoolmen could spend 
less time on their other devotional and pedagogical activities.58
Thus, to define differences between tasks of necessity and pursuits of  pleasure, 
as would a humanist, and to define differences between the goals of skill and craft 
intrinsic to a profession and the goals of a court or church job exterior to the 
 Musical Republic, as might a composer, were to engage in types of aesthetic 
 autonomy. In each case, people used music to achieve a goal that they separated 
from other types of goals. In the first case, humanist nobles, courtiers, and  burghers 
defined the experience of music as one directed inward, toward the moral 
 necessities of character and not toward the practical necessities of everyday life. 
In the second case, specialized musicians used standards of quality that were 
opaque to the non-specialist to define their own professional goals. Such musi-
cians found ways to align their inner professional goals with the external goals 
demanded by the dictates of courtly and religious institutions. Broadly speaking, 
while the  humanists grounded their practice of autonomy on an idea of the fine 
arts in which music was clearly linked to moral formation, the composers 
 grounded theirs on an idea of the theoretical autonomy of music. Only later, when 
musicians began to teach the amateurs more about the processes of music, did the 
two approaches merge to generate Romantic practices of autonomy. 
57 On musicians’ liberties in courts, see Werner BRAUN, Die Musik des 17. Jahrhunderts, ed. Carl 
Dahlhaus, Neues Handbuch der Musikwissenschaft, Vol. 4 (Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesell-
schaft Athenaion, 1981), 47-48. On their subaltern status, see Celia APPLEGATE, The Musical Cultures 
of Eighteenth-Century Germany, in The Organ as a Mirror of its Time: North European Reflections, 1610-
2000, ed. Kerala J. Snyder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
58 W. BRAUN, Musik des 17. Jahrhunderts, 32-33, 47-48.
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4. The Functions of Autonomy: Individual and Society
The ideals and practices of musical autonomy—theoretical, aesthetic, and 
 social—invariably have social and political benefits and dangers. While artists 
only developed an explicit theory of aesthetic autonomy in the 19th century, in 
part to maintain the quasi-religious functions of the arts within secular genres and 
contexts, in part to redefine their relationship to the new forms of state authority 
that developed after the French Revolution, at least some artists in the 17th were 
aware of the political and social potential of artistic autonomy. During the 17th 
century, there were two central arenas in which discussions about the social 
 functions of autonomy developed, discussions that later fed directly into the 
 Romantic theories of aesthetic autonomy. First, in France the literary Querelle des 
anciens et des modernes broached questions about the relationship between the 
 artist and the state. Second, in Germany scholars tried to parse the demands of 
religion and commerce in a satisfactory manner. In such debates, the champions 
of artistic autonomy sought to define a conception of the good life that they 
 believed in danger.
Within the Republic of Letters and the French Academy, the champions of the 
Ancients developed a concept of artistic autonomy in order to resist the political 
pressures of absolutist states.59 The Republic of Letters had its roots in the 
 humanism of the Italian Renaissance, in the groups of intellectuals devoted to the 
restitution of antique learning, including the practice of rhetoric. While groups of 
humanists and nobles often formed official or semi-official academies, associated 
with courts, the intellectuals also corresponded with each other as private 
 individuals. Moreover, they often specifically constituted their activities in 
 opposition to the rise of political absolutism and imperialism, first against the 
Holy Roman Empire of the Habsburg Charles V, and later against the collusion of 
state and church advanced by Richelieu and Colbert, councilors to Louis XIV. As 
Habsburg and French imperialists often donned the robes of religious authority 
to further their political ambitions, the defense of pagan authors implied both a 
commitment to standards of free discourse and debate, and the recognition of 
values other than those mandated by church and state. 
Thus, ancient authors provided not only formal models, but also standards of 
righteous behavior that the absolutist state could or should not touch. For exam-
ple, Nicolas Boileau, maligned as a pedant first by his adversaries in the Querelle 
and then by later historians of literature from Voltaire to the present, used the 
literary tradition of the ancients to oppose the political machinations of the 
 moderns. As Marc Fumaroli has written, for Boileau, »the honor and the  conscience 
59 On the political significance of aesthetic autonomy as a constant theme within the Republic of 
Letters, see Marc FUMAROLI, Les abeilles et les araignées, in La querelle des Anciens et des Modernes: 
XVIIe.-XVIIIe. siècles, ed. Anne-Marie Lecoq (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 32-37.
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of the man of letters have their true and autonomous foundation in a  literary 
 tradition independent of current events and derived from Antiquity.«60 Although 
both ancients and moderns did curry royal favor, they had different goals.  Ancients 
such as Boileau appealed to the personal power of Louis XIV and thereby pre-
served the relative political autonomy of individuals vis-à-vis the state and the 
church, if not the king. The moderns, on the other hand, appealed to the king as 
an abstract embodiment of both state and religious power.61 For the  moderns, all 
people were marionettes controlled by hands both royal and divine. Thus, by 
 arguing for the artistic nature of certain genres of writing, the party of the ancients 
gave literary works a political function, albeit a weak one from a modern perspec-
tive. There were standards of behavior, as well as a realm of the soul, over which 
world and state had no power. This political autonomy was  enshrined in the Re-
public of Letters.62
The champions of the ancients appealed less to the autonomy of the artwork 
than to the institutional autonomy of art. For example, Molière insisted on his 
right to criticize dogmatic theologians in his plays. It was, in other words, a plea 
for the social autonomy of the artist above all, that is, for his freedom from censor-
ship. However, the fight for the autonomy of art implicitly raised the central issue 
of the aesthetic autonomy of the artwork. Boileau separated to some degree 
 between form and content, between the mode of presentation and the subject mat-
ter presented. Even though he appealed to the ethical values presented in ancient 
texts—independence of thought, bravery, courage—he also depended on the 
 eloquent, artistic character of the literary tradition, and thus on the formal and 
stylistic qualities of artworks, to single out literary texts. »The verse best achieved 
and the most noble thought / Cannot please the spirit if the ear is wounded.«63 In 
other words, the formal qualities of verse did not have a particular political use, 
but certainly a political function. Of course, it was also possible to criticize the 
cultivation of aesthetic criteria as a step back from immediate civic concerns. In a 
beautifully phrased critique that portended his break with the Republic of Letters, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau criticized incipient aesthetic autonomy in his Discours sur 
les Sciences et les Arts of 1750. »One no longer demands of a man if he has probity, 
but rather if he has talents; nor of a book if it is useful, but rather if it is well 
 written. Recompense is given to those with fine spirit, while virtue rests without 
honors. There are a thousand prizes for beautiful discourses, and none for  beautiful 
60 »Pour Boileau, à l’inverse, l’honneur et la conscience de l’homme de lettres ont leur fondement 
propre et autonome dans une tradition littéraire indépendante de l’actualité et remontant à l’Antiquité.« 
Ibid., 136.
61 Ibid., 132.
62 On the history of the Republic of Letters in the 17th century, see Dena GOODMAN, The Republic 
of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 12-23.
63 »Le vers le mieux rempli, la plus noble pensée / Ne peut plaire à l’esprit, quand l’oreille est 
blessée.« Nicolas BOILEAU, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Françoise Escal (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 159.
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actions.«64 Rousseau criticized the tendency of writers to develop rhetorical 
 eloquence into an end in itself. No means to an end, eloquence had in his eyes 
wrongly become an aesthetic value in its own right.
There are several reasons that the Querelle, with its various political subtexts, 
did not affect German discussions of the arts during the 17th and early 18th 
 century. As Peter Kapitza has noted, German intellectuals knew of the Querelle, 
but did not feel the need to engage in the partisan polemics of the French debate.65 
First, in a checkered land of diverse political authorities, there was no omnipotent 
ruler comparable to Louis XIV to whom intellectuals could appeal or by whom 
they might be threatened. The lack of centralized authority thus lowered the 
stakes of the debate. In addition, if authors felt too restricted, they could presum-
ably move to a new city or state where greater tolerance in intellectual matters 
reigned. Second, the educated class in Germany tended to work in schools, 
 universities, and court administrative posts. Because they lacked the inducements 
to free exchange offered by the Parisian culture of the aristocratic salon, and 
 because they had a vested interest in the existing state and religious institutions, 
they had less need and reason to challenge existing authority and thus to formu-
late any demand for the autonomy of the arts. The salon allowed Parisian 
 intellectuals to draw upon the themes of ancient wisdom in order to move their 
discussions away from the closed discussions of the Republic of Letters character-
istic of earlier humanist debates. Third, and most importantly, Lutheran doctrine, 
itself based on humanist principles, mediated between ancients and moderns. 
 Lutherans were interested in the philological recovery of the wisdom of the 
 ancients, and of the Bible in particular, at the same time that they understood 
themselves as moderns. In general, Germans prided themselves for taking a 
 middle road, for avoiding the extreme positions advanced in France. The  situation 
would change toward the end of the 18th century, as German Aufklärer began to 
draw upon English and French thought more fully and to challenge existing  social 
institutions more emphatically, and as Prussia began to develop its politics of 
 expansion and absolutism under Frederick the Great. Until then, German 
 intellectuals lacked the political provocations and inducements that led their 
French neighbors to formulate a principle of the autonomy of the arts.
Thus, if French intellectuals put the humanist distinction between useless 
and useful pursuits to work to open a political space for individual autonomy, 
64 »On ne demande plus d’un homme s’il a de la probité, mais s’il a des talents; ni d’un livre s’il 
est utile, mais s’il est bien écrit. Les récompenses sont prodiguées au bel esprit, et la vertu reste sans 
honneurs. Il y a mille prix pour les beaux discours, aucun pour les belles actions.« Jean-Jacques 
 ROUSSEAU, Discours sur les sciences et les arts. Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité (Paris: Flammarion, 
1992), 50.
65 Peter K. KAPITZA, Ein bürgerlicher Krieg in der gelehrten Welt: Zur Geschichte der Querelle des 
Anciens et des Modernes in Deutschland (Munich: Fink, 1981), 428-33.
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even as they flattered their monarch, German intellectuals did not yet feel the 
need to strive for this autonomy. While the Germans followed the verbal battles 
assiduously, it was not until the 1750s and 1760s that Lessing, Klopstock, and later 
Schiller begin to reap the fruit of the Querelle, and to insist on their social  autonomy 
from courts and the aesthetic autonomy of their works.
But even if German intellectuals did not draw political consequences from 
the autonomy of the arts, they still made use of the humanist distinction between 
primary, useful activities (such as commerce) and ancillary activities (such as the 
arts). Indeed, this distinction was particularly important in regions of economic 
prosperity. In Das Neu-eröffnete Orchestre (1713), Johann Mattheson blamed three 
groups for a perceived decline of music: speculative theorists and pedants; 
 composers and performers who pretended knowledge that they lacked; and 
 finally Musikanten who worked for mercenary reasons. To answer Heinrich 
 Buttstedt’s reply, Mattheson later whetted his appetite for polemics on theorists 
and pedants, but in this early salvo he was at least as concerned with the morality 
of church musicians. And to protest money-grubbing, he argued a line that had 
long separated the liberal arts from practical pursuits.
Through the compulsion [produced by the desire for money] the ingenia are struck 
down, one loses one’s natural freedom of disposition—one becomes sullen, slothful, 
lazy, and indolent, and one can never achieve anything of value. When, however, the 
time is up, then so a youth is glad as if he had escaped from prison. He dons his 
 dagger at his side and walks away. And this should be a musician that one uses at a 
wedding.66
The compulsion [Zwang] linked to base desires led to both artistic and moral 
degeneration. Not just the quality of the performance suffered from the pursuit of 
money, but more seriously the performer lost his sovereign free spirit. Like 
 Aristotle and most later advocates of the liberal and fine arts, Mattheson advo-
cated a certain inner distance from desires, and believed that the arts depended 
on such circumspection.
Mattheson, the champion of that most worldly and expensive of genres, 
 opera, probably did not oppose the entrepreneurial spirit of Hamburg in all its 
facets. For many of his contemporaries, piety and commerce could exist in perfect 
harmony within the Protestant work ethic. Beekman Cannon noted that
66 »Denn durch den Zwang werden die Ingenia niedergeschlagen / der Mensch verliehret seine 
natürliche Gemüths Freyheit - er wird verdrießlich/träge/faul/schlaffrich/ und kan nimmer zu was 
rechts kommen. Wenn nun aber die Zeit um/ so freuet sich ein solcher Bursche noch als einer der aus 
dem Kercker entwischet ; stecket seinen Degen an die Seite und geht davon; Das soll nun ein Musicante 
seyn/ den man auf Hochzeiten gebrauchet.« Johann MATTHESON, Das Neu-Eröffnete Orchestre, fac-
simile ed. (Hamburg: Author, 1713; reprint, Laaber: Laaber-Verlag, 2002), 15.
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The noble Hamburg Senators must have been inspired to profound contemplation of 
the state of their souls when, between prayers, they turned to the notations of the 
Stock exchange, printed conveniently on the last pages of Melchior Christoph 
Wöttgen’s prayerbook, which showed on its title page a woodcut not of the church 
and its congregation but of Hamburg’s exchange and the stockbrokers.67
While a good Protestant could not achieve salvation through work, financial 
success could nonetheless be a sign of a divine calling, and so long as linked to 
asceticism in worldly concerns, no impiety.68 Moreover, amidst forays against the 
mercenary spirit of some musicians, Mattheson also complained bitterly in Das 
Neu-eröffnete Orchestre about the low pay given to German musicians. While 
 Mattheson conceived the pleasures of music and the profits of the musician as 
good, so long as linked to a moral attitude, he nonetheless presented the arts as a 
possible line of defense against capitalist utilitarianism. Again, the arts were 
 autonomous from commercial pursuits, though they had a clear moral purpose.
Within the Lutheran tradition, music had greater autonomy from the every-
day than other arts, as it was a special gift of God. Luther wrote that »next to the 
Word of God, music deserves the highest praise. She is a mistress and governess 
of those human emotions—to pass over the animals—which as masters govern 
men or more often overwhelm then.« Although Luther built upon a Classical and 
Renaissance fascination for the marvelous effects of music on the emotions, his 
specifically theological concerns began to separate the emotions brought forth by 
music from the emotions that arose in the course of daily life. While music was a 
religious and not an aesthetic experience, he nonetheless introduced the founda-
tions of a separability principle. Mattheson, for one, was attentive to the special 
qualities of music. If the current conditions of music making were in a sad state, 
he argued, music itself had lost none of its nobility. It was a gift of God and could 
not suffer from human mistreatment. Thus, while the arts in general opposed the 
abacus mentality of commerce, music singled itself out through its divinity, at 
least among right-minded musicians. Not only did Mattheson note the link 
 between music and theology, but he also argued that the materiality of the other 
arts sullied them with worldliness. »Other plaisirs do not hold a candle to this one 
[music]. They are all moreover subject to greater danger and to materie, while 
[music] on the other hand is almost wholly spiritual and occupies the soul.«69 The 
power of music to elicit rare experiences, opposed quotidian approaches to life, 
67 Beekman C. CANNON, Johann Mattheson: Spectator in Music, ed. Leo Schrade, Yale Studies in 
the History of Music, no. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 8.
68 Max WEBER, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 162.
69 »Andere Plaisirs reichen diesem nicht das Wasser / sind auch mit einander größerer Gefahr 
und Materie unterworfen dahingegen diese fast gantz spirituel ist und die Seele occupiret.« J. MATTHE-
SON, Das Neu-Eröffnete Orchestre, 33.
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later informed the Romantic aesthetics of absolute music. It existed in nuce in the 
Lutheran approach to the fine arts, as Mattheson makes abundantly clear. 
 Although Mattheson followed a Pietist path that diverged from the highways 
traveled either by the cosmopolitan Christoph Bernhard or by the Orthodox 
 Lutheran cantors and organists that followed him, they all believed in the funda-
mental divinity of the musical arts. The »divine science« apostrophized so often 
in treatises on musical poetics differed in name and in details from the »divine 
art« beloved by Mattheson, but they shared their opposition to the quotidian.
In both the French Academy and in the German church, then, artists used some 
concept of artistic autonomy to isolate or cultivate their individuality. In France, 
Boileau sought to resist the collusion of state and church under royal  authority, 
though he did not by any means resist royal authority. In Germany, Mattheson 
 conceived of music as an affair of the individual soul, and opposed it to normal 
 activities of everyday life. In each case, individuals used the practices and aesthetics 
of autonomy to define themselves as individuals and to protect some private value, 
whether the literary freedom or private morality. This link between artistic  autonomy 
and individual autonomy would only strengthen in the late 18th century, when 
 critics granted the inspired and individual genius the right to overturn the canons 
of decorum so central to the rhetorical approach to composition.
5. Concluding Remarks
To conclude this overview of 17th-century trends toward autonomy princi-
ples, it is possible to make some general remarks about the complex of theoretical 
phenomena, aesthetic ideals, and social practices that together form musical 
 traditions predicated on artistic autonomy. 
By building practices that produce works that do not evanesce in the explicit 
uses assigned to them in society, Christoph Bernhard and other North-German 
skilled musicians (improvisers and composers alike) reserved a sphere of activity 
to themselves. As productive musicians cultivating musical processes according 
to inner-professional criteria, they worked with and progressively extended a 
world of theoretical autonomy. Within the boundaries set by institutional princi-
ples of decorum, they could act with relatively little fear of interference to create 
music that could delight both producer and recipient, as well as achieve other 
religious and social ends. For such musicians, the professional skills and stand-
ards were in part a tribute to the real delight they took in a well-done perform-
ance or composition, and in part a protective shield against those outside of the 
profession.70 To extrapolate a general point, all artists, craftspeople, and profes-
70 Their skills and standards, along with their stability within church and court institutions, also 
sentenced them to a certain distance from their educated contemporaries. Laurenz LÜTTEKEN, Das 
K. Chapin: »A Harmony or Concord of Several 
and Diverse Voices«: Autonomy in 17th-Century 
German Music Theory and Practice
IRASM 42 (2011) 2: 219-255
248
sionals develop canons of skills and criteria that constitute intrinsic goods to their 
particular art. As people outside the art, craft, or profession may not know or have 
sufficient expertise to judge these skills, artists or craftsman enjoy the potential 
advantages and run the risks of a relative freedom from outside regulation. If 
their skills offer members of a group both a sense of cohesion and potential isola-
tion, it can also give them a means to relativize the demands of state and society. 
A claim for artistic autonomy can be a claim for personal freedom and autono-
my—a claim for religious or secular self-realization—and at times one fraught 
with political significance.
A claim for aesthetic autonomy can equally well be a sentence to insignifi-
cance and impotence. By raising the importance of specialist concerns that are 
distant from everyday political and social issues, artists may cede their political 
voices to those willing to act in the world of the mundane. If they strive to create 
a realm of mental or spiritual autonomy, artists can leave the political authorities 
greater freedom of movement in practical matters. At the extreme, they can even 
further the worldly designs of ruler or state as they take or offer a mental refuge 
in a purely artistic realm of free action. Indeed, artistic autonomy may only retain 
its positive political force when it is a fragile concept, when artists struggle to 
maintain their freedom from political, religious, or other institutions of power. As 
soon as the rights of artistic autonomy are taken for granted, art can offer mental 
or spiritual solace and strength—goals by no means to be sneezed at—but may 
lose its immediate relevance with respect to political issues.
At a social level, the cultivation of sophisticated artistic techniques can 
 become esoteric, though not necessarily less legitimate to those engaged in them, 
if the theoretical autonomy of works and musical processes is accepted too easily. 
Not only can specialists forget that they practice their arts every day and in the 
everyday, but they can forget to link their own inner-professional interests with 
the issues and concerns of a larger public. Taken to an extreme, artistic pursuits 
can estrange amateurs, without of course losing their vitality among the connois-
seurs. Such was the situation of learned contrapuntists at the beginning of the 
18th century.
But the practice of autonomy is not limited to professional practitioners of the 
arts. Humanists developed another concept of autonomy, and one with social 
functions of its own. In the tradition of the liberal and then the fine arts, critics 
distinguished between inner and outer-directed practices, between self-formation 
and well-being, on the one hand, and biologically and economically necessary 
tasks, on the other. While critics usually assigned inner-directed activities a social 
use—by forming better individuals one formed also a better society—they still 
Monologische als Denkform in der Musik zwischen 1760 und 1785, Wolfenbütteler Studien zur Aufklärung, 
no. 24 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1998), 17.
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separated it from the types of direct commercial and practical interactions that 
governed everyday social intercourse. Neither side of the equation is unimpor-
tant, and both continue to play important functions in modern society. Inner-di-
rected practices form the individual; outer-directed, quotidian practices further 
the concrete integration of the individual into society.
The history of music in 18th-century Germany can be told, among other ways, 
as a fusion of these two cultures of music, professional and humanist. As profes-
sional musicians learned to talk about their inner-professional interests in jour-
nals and pamphlets, they reached out to the tastes of people who valued music for 
its ancillary character. And as humanistically minded intellectuals lost faith in the 
intrinsic moral qualities of art, they sought to understand the play of emotions 
and tones and thereby legitimate their intrinsic pleasure in music. Around 1800, 
the proverbial year of reckoning, writers with educations in both traditions like 
Christian Friedrich Michaelis and E. T. A. Hoffmann fused the professionals’ 
 interest in the theoretical autonomy of music (musical process and structure) with 
the humanists’ development of the aesthetic autonomy (its »useless« character 
and its divine nature) to ground the Romantic tradition. They could not have 
done it without the work of musicians like Christoph Bernhard.
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Sažetak
»Harmonija ili složnost više različitih glasova«:
Autonomija u njemačkoj glazbenoj teoriji i praksi 17. stoljeća
Dobro je poznato da Tractatus compositionis augmentatus Christopha Bernharda – 
kao klasični primjer za kompozicijsku teoriju u tradiciji musicae poeticae – izlaže retorički 
način mišljenja. Retorika, donoseći estetiku u kojoj je glazba upravljena prema slušateljima 
i vezana uz određene svrhe, također pruža i temelje za teorijske, estetičke i društvene 
principe glazbene autonomije. Autonomija i funkcionalnost međusobno se ne isključuju, 
iako to znanstvenici katkada smatraju implicitnim. U ovome se članku, s jedne strane, u 
sje vernoj Njemačkoj u kasnom 17. stoljeću pronalaze tragovi razvitka pojmova i praksa 
češće vezanih uz rano 19. stoljeće, ali, s druge strane, i redefinira estetička autonomija kao 
povezanost s posebnim tipom funkcije: uporabom glazbe u težnji prema nekoj viziji »dobro-
ga života«, kao što je Aristotel imenovao krajnji cilj ljudskoga postojanja.
 Da bismo izbjegli laka odbacivanja principa glazbene autonomije nužno je napraviti 
neke razlike. U prvom poglavlju Tractatusa Bernhard je upotrijebio retoričku terminologiju 
kako bi definirao teorijsku autonomiju glazbenih procesa (prividnu neovisnost i zakonitost 
zvuka u pokretu) i glazbenog djela (krajnjeg rezultata skladateljske djelatnosti). Osim ove 
teorijske autonomije Bernhard je postavio razliku između posebnog »zadovoljstva« u glaz-
bi i konkretnih etičkih, vjerskih i političkih ciljeva, te tako ponudio načelo estetičke autono-
mije (razlika između glazbe koja se smatra ciljem po sebi, a ne sredstvom). Napokon, 
Bernhard je bio dijelom i ‘glazbene republike’, koja se sastojala od profesionalnih glazbe-
nika, i collegiuma musicuma, koji je objedinjavao humanistički nastrojeno građanstvo s 
vještim glazbenicima. U svakoj od ovih skupina ljudi su pravili razliku između djelatnosti i 
ciljeva vezanih uz glazbu i djelatnosti i ciljeva vezanih uz neprofesionalne ili svakodnevne 
poslove. Ovakve institucije dopuštale su glazbenicima relativnu društvenu autonomiju u 
razvijanju vještina i ciljeva unutar njihove profesije. Sudjelujući u ovim oblicima autonomije 
sudionici su pripisivali umjetnosti glazbe relevantnost i važnost. S pomoću toga nadali su 
se postići svoju viziju – priopćenu u luteranskim vrijednostima – o »dobrome životu«.
